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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopoly supplying a bun-
dle of a commodity and a related service, where the consumers private information
is captured by scalar variable. With constant marginal costs, we nd the standard
result where the good and the service in the bundle are lower than separately. How-
ever, under the increasing cost assumption, when the degree of the complementarity
becomes su¢ciently high, the marginal price of separate good is lower than the good
price in the bundle. Contrary to Martimort (1992), when good and service are per-
fectly complementary, we can not conclude that it is costly for consumers to sign
two contracts from di¤erent shops than to buy the bundle. Because of asymmetric
properties in the utility function, protability result of bundling strategy depends,
on the one hand, on the degree of complementarity between commodity and related
service and on the other hand, on the degree of the optional service.
JEL Classication: D42, L12, Q4
Keywords: Bundling, Nonlinear pricing, Energy market
Résumé
Cet article analyse la tarication non linéaire optimale pour un monopole of-
frant un package comprenant un bien et un service attaché au bien, lorsque ce
dernier augmente lutilité marginale que les consommateurs accordent au bien. Nous
examinons les mécanismes dincitation de révélation des préférences dans le cas
où linformation privée est représentée par un paramètre unidimensionnel. Sous
lhypothèse de coûts constants nous retrouvons le résultat standard où il est prof-
itable pour les consommateurs dacheter le bien et le service attaché sous forme de
package plutôt que séparément. Cependant, avec des coûts croissants, lorsque le de-
gré de complémentarité entre le bien et le service est su¢samment élevé, le prix mar-
ginal du bien séparé est plus faible que comme élément du package. Contrairement à
Martimort (1992), lorsque le bien et le service sont parfaitement complémentaires,
nous ne pouvons pas conclure quil est plus coûteux pour les consommateurs de
signer deux contrats aux di¤érents magasins que dacquérir le package. Du fait des
Corresponding author: marion.podesta@univ-savoie.fr, IREGE, University of Savoie, 4 Chemin de
Bellevue, BP 80439 Annecy-le-Vieux.
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asymétries prises en compte dans la fonction dutilité, la protabilité dune stratégie
de ventes liées dépend, dune part du degré de complémentarité entre le bien et le
service attaché, et dautre part du degré doptionalité du service lié.
JEL classication: D42, L12, Q4.
Mots-clés : Ventes liées, Tarication non-linéaire, Marchés énergétiques
1 Introduction
Recently, a trend towards deregulation of utilities industries (as telecommunications or
energy sectors) has been observed worldwide and has an impact on market structure. This
new environment incites rms to diversify their o¤ers, and they can compete with their
new rivals with the help of bundles. Simultaneously, a convergence phenonenom appears
and creates a strategic link between di¤erent markets. In telecommunications sectors,
the process of convergence across multimedia and telecom markets involves triple-play
or quadruple-play o¤ers. These packages include broadband, TV and xed telephony at
bundle discounts. In energy markets incumbents supply bi-energy bundles or o¤ers in-
cluding energy and services.1 Subsidiaries in telecommunications and energy sectors allow
to incumbents to propose bundles with several goods or services, therefore incumbents
keep a dominant position in these markets.
This paper deals with a private monopoly, mainly to depict a situation where market
power is high. We study pricing strategy for a rm supplying a good and a complementary
optional service, when the service increases the goods marginal utility and where the
consumers private information is captured by scalar variable.2 In our model, we use the
analysis of Martimort (1992, 1996) in a principal-agent context. Firm can sell good and
service separately (independent pricing) or as a bundle (pure bundling3). Contrary to
the Martimorts assumptions, there is no symmetry between the good and the related
service in the consumers utility function. In order to study the specicity of the service,
we use the nonlinear pricing. More precisely, the paper focuses on bundling to satisfy a
fundamental need (space heating needs, for instance), where the good can be tied with
a related service.4 We show that the protability of bundling depends on the degree of
complementarity between the good and the service, as well as on the optional character
of the service.
Martimort (1992, 1996), in a principal-agent model, introduces the possibility for a
common agent to contract with multiple principals. He compares the cooperative situa-
tion, this is the case where rms can o¤er a bundle, and the situation with noncooperation
under the assumption of nonlinear pricing. The results depend on the complementarity
1For example, Gaz de France-Suez proposes "Provalys" to professionals and "DolceVita" to residential
consumers. In parallel, Electricité de France provides "Essentiel Pro" to professionals and "Bleu Ciel" to
residential consumers. These bundles include energy and services as optimization of energy consumption.
For more details see http://www.energieetservice.fr/energie-et-service.
2It is most often assumed that the rm can observe only one variable. It is also common to suppose
that the observed variable has a single dimension, this is quality in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and quantity
in Maskin and Riley (1984). Wilson (1993) provides denitions and examples of multidimensional goods
and pricing.
3Pure bundling refers to the practice of selling two or more goods and/or services together in a bundle
at a unique price.
4The service for example may be technical maintenance or energy consultancy which enhances the
gross utility for the good.
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or the substituability between activities controlled by each principal. If the goods are
complements, bundling is an optimal strategy for the principals and consumers. However,
if the goods are substitutes, the consumers utility is better when there is noncooperation
between the principals, but prots are lower.
The bundling literature in the monopoly case shows that the optimal strategy is the
mixed bundling one for it obtains a maximum surplus from the consumers if the correlation
of reservation values is negative (Adams and Yellen, 1976, Schmalensee, 1984 and Mc Afee
et al, 1989). With the mixed bundling strategy, the goods are available both separately
and in a bundle. Since bundling allows the monopolist to extract more consumer rent, it
makes higher prots (since the correlation of consumers reservation values is negative).
However when competition increases, results are reversed. Bundling can reduce the rms
prot and increase the consumers rent.5 Literature on bundling has not been really
explored bundling strategy for a complementary service. In fact, models rarely integrate
the specicity of the service into the pricing strategy. The acknowledged fact is that
when the service is personalized, its ex-ante valuation is di¢cult (Bateson, 1995). In the
general case, the consumers commodity value is better than the service value. Thus, a
consumer has more di¢cult to give a benchmark price for a service, relatively to a good.
When monopoly uses a bundling strategy, it has an additional tool to practice price
discrimination. Moreover, nonlinear pricing is widely used in several markets (energy or
telecommunication markets, for instance) to supply one or several goods.6 Firm proposes
a menu of tari¤ to incite consumers to reveal their preferences7 and can extract more
consumers surplus.
This paper considers the case where the monopoly practices nonlinear pricing for both
a good and an attached service. The principal (monopoly) has two shops which can o¤er
the commodity and the optional service. We compare marginal prices for the good and
the service under an independent pricing strategy and when bundling is considered. In
the bundling case, both shops coordinate their pricing strategy to provide a bundle. In
the paper, two cases are considered. Firstly, monopoly costs are constants, the two shops
are supposed to be only retailers. Secondly, we consider that the di¤erent shops produce
the good and the service under increasing costs. However, incomplete information on
consumers type implies to implement an incentive compatible nonlinear pricing schedule
in both cases. Our denition of bundling is slightly di¤erent from the standard industrial
organization literature since we aim to study informational aspects of this kind of strategy
by a monopolist. Here, we consider that two productive units (or shops) can separately
produce the core good and the attached service but the commercial unit could sold either
separately or together. It is thus in this business view that we study the informational
gains and losses and the e¤ects of these practices on prices.
Under constant costs assumption, we show that it is less costly for consumers to buy
the bundle and rm has lower consumers rent compared with the independent pricing
strategy. Indeed when monopoly follows an independent pricing strategy, it would be
worse o¤ to propose separating contracts. The monopoly proposes a contract for the
commodity and another one for the service, it can capture more consumers rent from
the signature of each contract. However, when the monopoly provides a bundle it cannot
duplicate the independent contracts and captures only once the consumers rent.
With increasing costs and when the good and the service are perfectly complementary,
5See Reisinger (2006) and Economides (1993) in the duopoly case.
6For example, for the gas supply, the industrial gas retailler uses a two-part tari¤. It comprises a
uniform price for each unit of gas purchased plus a xed fee payable if any positive amount is purchased.
7Since consumers willingness to pay is a private information, a problem of asymmetric information
appears between rm and consumers. These relations are described in principal-agent models.
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the optionality of the service has an impact on the marginal price of separate good. The
marginal price of the good is lower separately than as a component of the bundle. Because
of asymmetries in the utility function, the protability of bundling depends on the trade-
o¤ between the degree of complementarity and the degree of the optional service.
The following section sets out the model. Firstly, we consider that the monopoly has
constant production costs. The section 3 considers the case where the shops coordinate
their o¤ers and propose a bundle, and in section 4, we remove this assumption to consider
that the two shops provide the commodity and the service separately. The section 5
compares the di¤erent types of strategies. Secondly, in order not to limit our analysis at
constant costs and to focus on the energy retailers concerns, we discuss to increasing costs
in section 6. Finally, section 7 proposes few concluding remarks.
2 The model
The model focuses on energy demand to satisfy a fundamental need, for instance space
heating, lighting or air conditioning needs for residential consumers. We consider a space
heating need for instance, which can be provided by a couple of energy (x), gas or elec-
tricity and also a level of service (s). The rm o¤ers a good (energy) and a related
(complementary) service, it can be technical maintenance or energy consultancy. The
gross utility is given by:
u(H; )
where H is the level of heating achieved and depends on the consumers preferences
denoted . Heating is obtained by a given technology which combined both the quantity
of energy consumed x  0, and the related service level purchased s  0. Hence, the utility
can be directly written as an increasing asymmetric function of x and s, let u(H; ) =
u(x; s; ) which satises the following requirements for all y  0:
8y; u(y; 0; )  u(0; y; ) (H1)
Moreover the usual Spence-Mirless property is veried and given by:
ux(x; s; ) > us(x; s; )  0 (H2)
where subscripts represent partial second derivatives. The (energetic) good is intrinsi-
cally preferred to the service since the component cannot provide heating alone. As a
result, the technical service can be viewed as optional from the consumers point of view
as its marginal utility is always smaller than the one for the good for all types considered.
Whenever ux(x; s; ) > us(x; s; ), the service is not totally an option but neither essen-
tial. However if it is the case that us(x; s; ) = 0, the service is viewed as a pure option
from the consumers point of view.
We also assume strict concavity8 and complementarity between energy and service
such as:
uxs(x; s; )  0 (H3)
The preferences of consumers are given by a single-dimensional parameter  2  
[; ]  R+ with a distribution function F ().9 In incomplete information, the monopoly
8More precisely this implies that uss < 0; uxx < 0 and ussuxx   (uxx)2 > 0. Moreover we assume
uxx(x; s; ) > 0.
9The density function f() is supposed to be everywhere non-negative.
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knows the distribution of consumers preference but it doesnt know exactly each con-
sumers reservation price. We also dene '() = 1 F ()
f()
, the informational cost or virtual
cost, which represents a cost for the rm, and it is decreasing10 in : '0()  0. The infor-
mation cost is generated by the informational advantage of the agent over the principal.
To simplify, the costs are supposed to be identical and increasing convex for both
service and good units produced:
C(x; s) = w(x+ s) +
k
2
(x2 + s2)
In order not to limit our study, we analyze two normalized cases. Firstly, we suppose that
the shops sell their products at the market prices, in this case we suppose that marginal
costs are constant. The linear cost function (with k = 0), when the monopoly is a simply
retailer of the energy and the service, is given by:
C(x; s) = w(x+ s) (H4)
with c(x) = C(x; 0) and c(s) = C(0; s) are respectively the cost function of the good and
the service.
Secondly, we remove this assumption to focus on the case where the shops produce
energy and service sold to consumers, i.e when costs express increasing marginal slope
so we normalize w = 0. The following increasing convex function satises the previous
assumptions:
C(x; s) =
k
2
(x2 + s2) (H5)
In order to simplify the analysis and without loss of generality, we set k = 1.
Suppose that the monopolist sells its products using a nonlinear tari¤ =, the con-
sumers net utility is given by:
U =

u(x; s; ) =
0
if x; s > 0
if x; s = 0
where = is the total expenditure paid if consumers buy either x units of good and s units
of service in the bundling case, either x, or s in the independent pricing case. With the
independent pricing strategy, = can be divided in two respective parts, t for the energy
and  for the related service: = = t +  . With bundling strategy, the nonlinear tari¤ is
denoted = = T . In each case, we consider nonlinear tari¤s with a xed fee and a variable
part.
The timing of the game is the following. First, the agent discovers his type. Then,
the principals o¤er simultaneously the contracts, or equivalently the direct revelation
mechanisms: T (^) or t(^) and (^). Second, the agents accept or refuse the proposal
they respectively receive. If the agents accept, they make their reports to the principal.
Finally, the tari¤ T (^) or t(^) and (^) as well as the quantities of good and attached
service fx(^); s(^)g are implemented.
In our setting, the rm only cares about its expected prots, and seeks to max-
imize E(). Moreover, the consumer must have adequate incentives to reveal his type
10This is an acceptable assumption as Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) have shown. As the type increases,
the relative weight of types above  decreases. The rm is more concerned about the costs left below .
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truthfullyincentive compatibility (IC)and to participate in the mechanism voluntary
individual rationality (IR). The program facing the monopoly is:
maxE() =
Z 

f=()  C(x(); s())gf()d (EP)
U()  u(x(); s(); ) =()  u(x(^); s(^); ) =(^) (IC)
U()  0 (IR)
The(IC) constraint means that the rm lets a consumers surplus higher when the con-
sumer reveals his preferences and chooses an optimal price schedule than when he lies
about his preferences and would look like another type. With this constraint the monopoly
encourages the consumers to reveal their preferences. With the (IR) constraint the rm
must incite the consumers to purchase by leaving them a positive net surplus.
To go further, we can specify a quasi-concave function for which assumptions above
are fullled:
u(x; s) = (x+ s) + 2xs  
2
x2   
2
s2 (H6)
where  2 [0; 1] ;  2 [0; 1
2
] and without loss of generality, we set  = 1. The parameter 
represents the optional character of the service. If  = 0, it is viewed as totally optional
and respectively when  = 1, it becomes essential to satisfy the fundamental need. The
parameter  is the degree of complementarity between the good and the attached service.
If  = 0, they are independent and contrary if  = 1
2
, the good and the service are
perfectly complementary.
The information cost '(), previously dened, can be specied with a uniform law as:
F () =
   
    thus '() =
    (H7)
We will use this assumption in the sequel in particular to determine an implicit solution
in the independent pricing case.
In the following, we will focus on interior allocation for good and service (x; s > 0),
we will explicit the parametric restrictions involved when necessary. In sections 3 to 5, we
rst consider that (H4) is true, that is costs are constants and we relax this assumption
in section 6, assuming that (H5) holds..
3 Nonlinear pricing schedule and bundling
In this section, the monopoly can o¤er a bundle composed of a good (energy) and a
related complementary service (for instance technical consultancy). The monopoly has
two separated shops which coordinate to propose a nonlinear tari¤ = = T , for the bundle.
Ex-post, the nonlinear tari¤ T is implemented as a three-part schedule and has the
following form:
T = Z + px+ rs, Z = T   px  rs
where Z is the xed fee of the tari¤, p and r are respectively the energy and the service
rates, and x and s are the relative quantities. Solving the restated problem (see Appendix
B for details), the quantities of good and service are given by:
xB() =
(   '())(1 + 2)  w(1 + 2)
(1  42) and s
B() =
(   '())( + 2)  w(1 + 2)
(1  42)
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The quantities11 increase with consumers willingness to pay.12 The degree of optionality
has a more important impact for the service in the bundle than for the good and this
as much as the degree of complementarity is higher.13 Therefore, T is the overall tari¤
that consumers pay to purchase the bundle. The xed fee of the three-part tari¤ can be
directly restated as: Z() = T ()  pB()xB()  rB()sB():
Proposition 1 The marginal price of the service depends on the degree of optionality but
it is not the case for the commodity price, these prices are given by:
pB() = pF () + '()
rB() = rF () + '() 
Here pF () and rF () are respectively prices of good and related service in rst-best
situation.14 The marginal price of the service is lower than the marginal price of the good
because the service is optional. The monopoly less distorts the service price in relation
to the good price and this e¤ect is due to the asymmetric information. As marginal price
of the service is low, as well as its quantity, the information cost is captured by the xed
fee of the three part schedule.15 Concerning good price in the bundle, it not depends on
the optional character of the service.
In a more general setting, at the equilibrium, prices of commodity and service would
verify (omitting arguments):
pB() = ux(x
B; sB; ) = c0(xB) + '()ux(x
B; sB; )
rB() = us(x
B; sB; ) = c0(sB) + '()us(x
B; sB; )
There are two e¤ects for marginal prices in bundle. First, marginal prices are higher than
in complete information due to the information cost which is positive. Second, quantities
are lower than in complete information situation. Indeed in this general setting, it is
di¢cult to measure which e¤ect dominates. Proposition 1 claries these tradeo¤ in our
specic case.
4 Separate sales and nonlinear tari¤
In this section, we consider the situation where two principals (the shop 1 is the energy
retailer and the shop 2 is the service retailer) supply their contracts to a same type of
agent under a nonlinear pricing dened by: = = t +  . However, our analysis slightly
di¤ers from Martimort (1992) as u(x; s; ) cannot be a symmetric function since energy
and service dont fullled exactly the same intrinsic needs.
The agent maximizes his utility in relation to the rates of the good and the service
bought and in relation to his report type (^) according his own type (). At equilibrium
the agent report is truthfully, so the utility function for a consumer is given by:
U() = max
^x;^s
u(x(^x); s(^s); )  t(^x)  (^s) when (^x; ^s) = (; )
11For a positive level of attached service, we assume a condition on w i.e. w < w where w =
(+2) (+2)
1+2 .
12See appendix B.1.
13Indeed, dx
B
d
= 2( '())
1 42 <
dsB
d
= ( '())
1 42 :
14These levels are detailed in the Appendix A.
15Here dZ
d
() = sF () > 0. The xed fee of the three part schedule Z is increased in  for .
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Here t is the price for the energy bought from the shop 1 and  is the price for the level
of service purchased from the shop 2. Ex-post, the reports for energy and service are
truthfully: (^x = ) and (^s = ). The rst order of incentive compatibility constraints
are given by:
(^ = )

ux(x(); s(); ) _x()  _t() = 0
us(x(); s(); ) _s()  _() = 0 (1)
The necessary optimal condition can allow us to write (with the envelope theorem):
_U() = u(x(); s(); )
This rent is increasing and must keep a positive value for all values of  (under the IR
constraint). Consequently, we minimize the consumer rent with low bound constraint in
 : U() = 0:
The principals, the energy retailer (shop 1) and the service retailer (shop 2), must
implemented a mechanism design which incite the consumer to tell the true and to reveal
their preferences. Ex-post, the agent would be well advised to report his true type than
he lies about their preferences (^x; ^s) = (; ). The second order incentive conditions are
given by the sign of the hessian of U and are given in appendix C.1.
4.1 Sales of good
In this case we consider only the program of the shop 1. Ex-post, the two-part tari¤ for
the energy supply is:
t = A+ px, A = t  px
where A is the xed fee of the tari¤ and t is the overall price that consumers pay from
energy purchase. The cost, with an independent pricing, is proportionate to the quantity
of good bought and with constant costs (H4) is given by: C(x; 0) = c(x). The shop
1 maximizes its expected prots (EP) under the rst and the second order incentive
constraints (1) with t() = t(x()). In appendix C.1 using the analysis of Martimort (1992)
we solve the shop 1 prot maximization problem. In general, if we note '() = 1 F ()
f()
,
the equilibrium price for the good is given by:
pIP () = c0(xIP ()) + '()
 
ux(x
IP (); sIP (); ) + IIP ()

(2)
Comparing this price16 with the energy price in the bundling case, the additional term
IIP () is positive thus it increases the marginal price of the separate good. Nevertheless,
this term IIP () is not inuenced by the optionality of the service. In the separate sales,
we can conclude that the independent good price is always higher than as component of
the bundle.
4.2 Sales of service
For the sales of service, we consider only the program of the shop 2. As for the shop 1 in
the previous section, we give the ex-post two-part tari¤ for the service supplied:
 = B + rs, B =    rs
16With x() = xF () and IIP () =
us(x(); s(); )uxs(x(); s(); ) _s()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() + us(x(); s(); )
:
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where B is the xed fee of the tari¤ and  is the overall price that consumers pay for the
service bought. With (H4), costs are proportionate to the level of service chosen and are
given by: C(0; s) = c(s).
In appendix C.2, we solve the shop 2 prot maximization problem. the equilibrium
price of service is given by:
rIP () = c0(sIP ()) + '()
 
us(x
IP (); sIP (); ) + J IP ()

(3)
Comparing with the marginal price of service17 as part of bundle, the term J IP () increases
the separate marginal price since it is positive. However, as for the good sales, this
additional term J IP () is not inuenced by the optionality of the service. In the following
section, we solve the system.
4.3 Independent pricing schedule
The contract is optimal if there is a couple fx(); s()g which satisfy the equation system
(2) and (3), so called Hamilton-Jacobi system; -omitting arguments:  c0(x) + ux(x; s; )  '()  ux(x; s; ) + IIP () = 0
 c0(s) + us(x; s; )  '()
 
us(x; s; ) + J
IP ()

= 0
(4)
with x() = xF () and s() = sF (). In general, one can conclude that the separate
marginal prices of the good and the service are always higher than as a part of bundle.
As Martimort (1992), one nd that it is costly for consumers to buy the good and the
service separately due to the implicit competition between the two shops. In the general
case, bundling is an optimal strategy for both principals and consumers.
In our specic setting (with constant costs), the Hamilton-Jacobi system (4) can be
restated, as -omitting arguments-:(
(2   )  w   x+ 2s  (   ) 2 _s
2 _x+
= 0
(2   )  w   s+ 2x  (   ) 2 _x
2 _s+1
= 0
Using the method of Olsen-Osmundsen (2001) and under specication (H7), there is
an optimal linear solution fx; sg which allow us to rewrite the program as:
xIP () = xF () + (   )x (5)
sIP () = sF () + (   )s
Where xF () and sF () are respectively quantities of good and service.18 At the equilib-
rium, values of x and s given in the appendix C.3 are negative, one can directly conclude
that these quantities are sub-optimal than in the rst-best situation. The marginal prices
are given by:
pIP () = pF () + (   )(1 + Y )
rIP () = rF () + (   )( + Y )
17With s() = sF () and JIP () =
ux(x(); s(); )uxs(x(); s(); ) _x()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _s() + ux(x(); s(); ))
.
18As in the bundling situation, we give the condition on w for which the level of attached service is
positive: ~w =
 (2(4 )+
p
1+32 2(1+2))+4(+2)
4(1+2) > w.
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with Y = y
X
and y = 162+
p
1 + 32 2 1 (here Y  1). These prices are both increasing
with the optional character of the service.19 Nevertheless, the parameter  a¤ects more
the information cost for the good than for the service.20
5 Bundling strategy versus independent pricing
In this section, we compare marginal prices when shops coordinate on a bundling strategy
and the case where there is no cooperation with an independent pricing strategy. At the
equilibrium, the quantities21, under our specic assumptions, can be rewritten as:
xF () > xB() > xIP ()
sF () > sB() > sIP ()
In the bundling case, the optimal quantities of good and service are higher than in the
separate sales. In the explicit case, we can rewrite marginal prices of the energy and the
related service as:
pIP () = pB() + (   )Y (6)
rIP () = rB() + (   )Y
It implies that the marginal prices are higher when shops provide two di¤erent con-
tracts than when they provide a bundle (since Y > 0). In the section 3, we have shown
that the marginal price of the service in the bundle depends on the degree of its op-
tionality. With an independent pricing strategy, the degree of the optional service has
also an impact on the marginal price of good. The parameter  has an inuence on the
information cost for the separate good.
When service is purely optional ( = 0), the marginal price of good is identical in
an independent pricing strategy or in a bundling one, that is for all  2 , but it is
not necessarily the case for the service rate. Indeed, the marginal price of service is
always higher independently than in a bundle. As the service is not essential to satisfy
the fundamental need, the monopoly xes a lower price for the service in a bundle than
independently and raises the price of good as a component of the bundle.
Proposition 2 One can conclude that:
pF () < pB()  pIP ()
rF ()  rB() < rIP ()
The price gap between the energy price in a bundle and sold separately depends on the
degree of the optional service.
The previous proposition states that the optional characteristic has an impact on the
marginal prices of the independent good and the service bound. The discount when
consumers purchase the good in the bundle rather than separately is informational (see
19Indeed,
d(1+y
X
)
d
= y
X
and
d(+y
X
)
d
= 1:
20Indeed, dp
IP
d
= y'()  drIP
d
= '().
21See appendix D.1.
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equation 6). Whereas, this informational rebate appears for the service when it is close
to the rst-best situation.
These results come from the asymmetric utility function (assumptions H1 and H2),
since energy and service dont fullled exactly the same intrinsic needs. The independent
pricing strategy implies ine¢ciencies due to the implicit competition between the two
shops, the principals should coordinate to provide a bundle.
The global analysis is done in Martimort (1992, 1996) in the case where u() has strong
symmetric properties. If it was the case here then any optimal independent nonlinear
pricing scheme leads a continuum of allocations (xIP (); sIP ()) such that22:
s1() = x1()  xIP () = sIP ()  xB() = sB() (7)
In this symmetric setting, (which would correspond to our limit case where  = 1),
Martimort (1992) has shown that independent pricing introduces ine¢ciencies due to
the implicit competition between shop managers (principals) and of course bundling is
dominant ex ante, that is E(B)  E(I), since by denition bundling maximizes the
total expected prot. In our model (where   1), one cannot directly conclude that
the inequality (7) holds because of asymmetric properties (H1)-(H3) we consider. The
optimal quantities of the good and the service when shops follow an independent pricing
strategy are smaller than the cooperative situation that is:
s1() = x1()  sIP ()  xIP () < xB() = sB()
Concerning marginal prices, in the specic case, one can conclude that:
pF () = rF () < rB()  pB() 7 rIP ()  pIP ()
In the benchmark, the marginal prices of good and service are equal, as well in the bundle
when the service is considered as mandatory ( = 1). Moreover, prices are both lower in
the benchmark than as components of the bundle. The information cost tends to increase
rates in incomplete information case.
However, it exists a threshold of complementarity degree between good and service:
T () = 1
2
 1
2 2 1
, where the marginal price of the good in bundle can be higher than
the level of separate service ( < T ()). Finally, marginal price of the separate service
is always lower than price of the separate good unless they are perfectly complementarity
(if  = 1
2
).
In order not to limit our analysis at constant costs and to focus the energy retailers
concerns, the following section introduces the increasing costs assumption.
6 Increasing marginal costs
Until now, we have considered the case where the di¤erent shops are only retailers. In this
section, we remove this assumption to consider the situation where the two shops produce
good (energy) and service sold to consumers. In this way, contrary to the constant costs
with market prices, principals have increasing costs, given by (H5) in section 2, introducing
decreasing scale returns.
22Solution s1() = x1() are such that:
 c0(x) + ux(x; x; )  2'()ux(x; x; ) = 0
11
6.1 Bundling strategy
In the bundling strategy, the shops 1 and 2 can provide a bundle. At the equilibrium,
quantities of good and service are given by:
xB() = xF ()  (   ) 1 + 
2(1  2) and s
B() = sF ()  (   )  + 
2(1  2) (8)
where xF () and sF () are still quantities of good and attached service in the rst-best
situation (given in Appendix A). These quantities are increasing23 with the type of
consumers. Moreover, the impact of optionality degree is more important for the service
bought than for the good,24 and this as much as the degree of complementarity is high.
When the two shops follow a pure bundling strategy, they propose a unique nonlinear
tari¤ for the bundle. Marginal prices of the good and the service, are given by:
pB() = pF () + (   )(1    2
2)
2(1  2)
rB() = rF () + (   )(     2
2)
2(1  2)
As  2 [0; 1
2
] and  2 [0; 1], the energy price is always higher in the bundle than in the
complete information situation due to the information cost which is positive, even if the
service is purely optional.
As well as in the bundling situation with constant costs, the e¤ect of the optional
service increases marginal prices but this impact is more pronounced for the level of
service and when the degree of complementarity is high.25 The information cost is low
for the marginal price of service on account of the optional character.26 Therefore, the
service is less costly than the good in the bundle,27 this is due to the fact that consumers
enjoy a higher utility by consuming energy relatively to the service.
6.2 Independent pricing strategy
Now the system (4) can be rewritten as:(
2      2x+ 2s  (   ) 2 _s
2 _x+
= 0
(2   )  2s+ 2x  (   ) 2 _x
2 _s+1
= 0
The method used is the one of Olsen-Osmundsen (2001), as in section 4. With an uniform
law, it exists a linear optimal solution fx; sg such that:
xIP () = xF () + (   )x
sIP () = sF () + (   )s
23See appendix B.2.
24Indeed: dx
B
d
= ( '())
2(1 2) <
dsB
d
= ( '())
2(1 2) .
25Indeed: dp
B
d
= ( '())
2(1 2) <
drB
d
=  '()(1 2
2)
2(1 2) .
26Here (1    22)  (     22) = (2 + 1)(   1)(  1) > 0
27Indeed: (pB   rB) = ( +1)( 2'() '() )2(+1) > 0:
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At the equilibrium, the couple fx; sg is given in appendix C.4 and values of parameters
x and s are both negative. The marginal prices are given by:
pIP () = pF () +
1
D
(   )(m+ n)
rIP () = rF () +
1
D
(   )(m+ n)
we show that28 m > 0  n. These prices depend on the degree of complementarity as well
as the degree of the optional service. Since m > n, the parameter of optionality  a¤ects
the information cost and more on marginal price of service than on the marginal price of
good. The introduction of increasing costs has an impact on the good price contrary to
section 4. Here the monopoly less distorts the good price than the service price.
6.3 Bundling versus independent pricing strategies
The gure 1 compares bundling and independent pricing strategies with increasing costs.
Results di¤er from those of section 5 under the constant costs assumption.
Figure 1: Comparison between prices of good and service independently and in a bundle
There are two areas in the gure 3. In the rst area, below to the full line curve (where
 < ^x()), the separate prices for the good and for the service are both higher than those
as components of the bundle. This situation is the standard case where a consumer yields
a discount for the bundle rather than the separates sales. This analysis holds when the
good and the service are independent, where  = 0. Usually the conventional wisdom (as
28with m = 84   3(
p
82 + 1 + 1)2 +
p
82 + 1 + 1 and n = (10  2
p
82 + 1)3   4, therefore,
(m  n) = (2 + 1)(   1)2(4 +
p
82 + 1 + 1) > 0
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well as economic literature), tells us that it is less costly to produce a good and a service
in a bundle rather than independently (saving costs for the packaging, for instance), so
we expect that prices follow this cost saving. Here this is the case, but in the second case
below, this argument doesnt hold anymore.
In the second area, above to the full line curve (where  > ^x()), the price of the
separate good is lower than as component of the bundle and at the same time, the service
price is less costly in the bundle compared to its separate price. Indeed:
pB ? pIP if  7 ^x()
rB < rIP , 8 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1
2
]
and here ^x() =
1
4
(
p
82 + 1  1).
It is interesting to see how, with increasing costs, the price of the independent good
can be lower than the tied good. The introduction of increasing costs has a strong impact
on the good price since results of section 5 are reversed. Nevertheless, there is no impact
on the service price which is always lower in the bundle than sold separately.
When the good and the related service are perfectly complementary ( = 1
2
), we are
in the second area. The intuition suggests that the bundling strategy is more protable
when the components of the bundle are complementary. It is straightforward for the
monopoly to charge a high price for the good in the bundle. As the bundling strategy
allows monopoly to practice price discrimination, consumers who have an intensive use of
the good accept this high price. Consumers have more utility by consuming the good in
relation to the service. The monopoly can charge a low price for the service as component
of the bundle compared to the separates sales. Even if the price of the bundle is higher
than the sum of the separates sales, the bundling strategy can be an e¤ective strategy.
Some consumers consider that it is better to spend a large additional sum instead of
making themselves the bundle. When the service is purely optional,  = 0 (8 < 1
2
),
results are the same.29
6.4 Comparative statics
Bundling strategy allows producers to restrict their unit production costs, with costs
saving on packaging or storage for instance, or more generally, on the "selling costs".
Simultaneously, when products are perfect complements, bundling literature advocates
a high price for the good and the service sold in the bundle. In our analysis, the op-
tionality of the service plays an important role and has an impact on the marginal price
of the independent good. In this case, the good sold in the bundle is higher than sold
independently.
With complementary goods, the analysis of our model is not as explicit as those of
Martimort (1992) where utility function is symmetric. Martimort shows that the inde-
pendent pricing strategy is ine¢cient for consumers, since it is costly to sign di¤erent
contracts to di¤erent shops. Here, it is not explicitly the case as the price of the indepen-
dent good can be lower than the price of the tied good. The optionality of the service as
well as the increasing costs emphasize that independent pricing strategy can be e¤ective
from consumers point of view. The overall analysis is given by the gure 2.
In this graphic s() = f 2 [0; 12 ] j rIP = rFg.
29See appendix D.2.
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Figure 2: Comparison between prices with independent pricing, bundling strategies and
the rst-best situation
The following table shows possible outcomes according to the di¤erent areas in relation
to the type of strategies:
 FB: Complete Information situation ("First-Best situation")
 IP: Independent Pricing strategy
 VL: Bundling strategy
IP/FB VL/FB IP/VL
Area 1
pIP () > pF ()
rIP () > rF ()
pB() > pF ()
rB() > rF ()
pIP () > pB()
rIP () > rB()
Area 2
pIP () > pF ()
rIP () > rF ()
pB() > pF ()
r
B() < rF ()
p
IP () < pB()
rIP () > rB()
Area 3
pIP () > pF ()
r
IP () < rF ()
pB() > pF ()
r
B() < rF ()
p
IP () < pB()
rIP () > rB()
Table 2.1: possible outcomes in relation to di¤erent areas
In order to understand the gure 2 and table 2.1., we comment each areas.
In area 1, the standard case occurs: the information cost is taken into account for the
monopoly, so that marginal prices are ranked with respect to the information cost.
In area 2, the information cost falls signicantly the marginal price of the service and
it becomes smaller than its marginal cost. This e¤ect can be viewed as an "informational
dumping e¤ect".30 There is a trade-o¤ between the degree of complementarity and the
30Dumping is often dened as the ability of a monopoly to x a lower price in order to force the
potential entrants to revise downwards their estimations of protability on this market. Ex-ante, this
allows the monopoly to deter potential competitors to enter the market.
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degree of the optional service. The monopoly lowers its bundle price ("price e¤ect") but it
makes up for quantities sold: the quantity e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect. However, the
dumping e¤ect appears even when the degree of service is not totally optional to satisfy
the essential need. Moreover as evoked in the previous section, bundling strategy allows
monopoly to practice price discrimination, therefore consumers who have an intensive use
of the good accept a higher price. This dumping e¤ect would possible because of using
two-part tari¤, the monopoly can consequently rise the xed part.
Analytically, the area 3 (where  > s()) is the most interesting one since the
dumping e¤ect appears for the service in both independent pricing and bundling strategies.
As the service is optional, its price is lower than its marginal cost. This dumping e¤ect
was underlined in the bundling case, nevertheless when the service is purely optional, the
degree of complementarity must be high enough to enjoy this discount.31 Moreover, this
analysis holds when the components are perfect complements ( = 1
2
). The marginal price
of service is lower than its marginal cost, moreover the quantities are sub-optimal32 in
relation to the complete information case. As the variable part of the tari¤ is minimized,
the monopoly can compensate this loss through the xed-fee of the tari¤: this e¤ect can
be described as a "catching e¤ect".
Moreover, the marginal price of independent good is lower than its price in the bundle.
The introduction of increasing costs has an impact on the good marginal price as this case
not occurs with constant costs. This price discount for the independent good appears when
the good and the service have a high degree of complementarity. With complement goods,
the bundle is attractive for many consumers and the monopoly xes a high marginal price
for the good relatively to the independent pricing strategy.
One can not directly conclude that the overall analysis given by Martimort (equation
(7) to section 5) holds because asymmetric properties (H1)-(H3) are considered. In our
analysis framework, one can conclude that:
xF () > xB() ? xIP ()
sF () > sB() > sIP ()
and prices can be rewritten as follow:
pF () < pIP () ? pB()
rF () ? rIP () > rB()
As we compare bundling and independent pricing, considering marginal prices only, one
can conclude that it is not always less costly for consumers to purchase each unit of good
and service at two di¤erent shops rather than together in a bundle. To have a comparison
of the entire cost, we should compare the consumers rent in each conguration (that is
including the x part of the tari¤).
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing when a rm o¤ers a commodity and an
attached service. We compare the bundling strategy and the independent pricing one.
The protability of bundling strategy depends on the degree of the optional service and
31 =
p
7 
p
17
4  0:424.
32See appendix C.3.
16
the degree of complementary between the good and the associated service. This paper
deals with two cases concerning the cost function.
In a rst time, we suppose that the shops sell their products at the market prices, they
have constant marginal costs. In the general case, one can conclude that the separate
marginal prices of the good and the service are always higher than as a part of bundle.
As Martimort (1992), one nd that it is costly for consumers to buy the good and the
service separately due to the implicit competition between the two shops. In the general
case, bundling is an optimal strategy for both principals and consumers.
With the specied utility function, we can conclude that with bundling strategy, the
optimal quantities are higher than those with an independent pricing strategy. If the
service is purely optional i.e when  = 0, marginal prices of the good sold independently
and in a bundle are the same. However if  > 0, this is the standard case where the good
in the bundle is lower than separately. For the attached service, whatever its degree
of optionality, the marginal price in bundle is always lower than sold independently.
Comparing marginal prices, consumers prefer to buy the good and the attached service in
a bundle as long as the degree of optionality is positive otherwise consumers are indi¤erent.
In a second time, we use increasing costs to describe the situation where both shops
produce the good and the related service. We show that there is a trade-o¤ between the
degree of complementarity and the optionality of the service. The overall analysis (see
Figure 2) shows that there are three cases through di¤erent areas. Limiting the analysis
to the polar cases ( = f0; 1
2
g;8), the results are the following. With the specied
utility function, when the good and the service are independent ( = 0), if the monopoly
commits to a bundling strategy then marginal prices are both lower then the separates
sales. The monopoly prefers to leave a signicant unit margin and compensates to the
quantities sold. Comparing marginal prices, consumers prefer to buy the good and the
attached service in a bundle.
However, when the degree of the complementarity becomes su¢ciently high (when
 > f^x(); s()g), the marginal price of the separate good is lower than the good
price in the bundle. The intuition suggests that the protability of a bundling strategy
depends on the degree of complementarity between the good and the attached service. It
is straightforward for the monopoly to charge a higher price for good in bundle.
In the polar case when good and service are perfectly complementary, contrary to
Martimort (1992) we can not conclude that it is costly for consumers to sign two con-
tracts from di¤erent shops than to buy the bundle. With the asymmetric function, the
marginal price of good can be lower independently than in the bundle whereas the service
is more attractive when there is a cooperation between principals. Because of asymmetric
properties in the utility function, protability results of bundling strategy depends, on
one hand, on the degree of complementarity between commodity and related service and
on the other hand, on the degree of the optional service.
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Appendix
A First Best
Without any further calculs, rst-best levels for prices and quantities are given. More
details could be found in Podesta and Poudou (2008).
A.1 Constant costs
Explicitely, with (H4), quantities of the good and the attached service are given by:
xF () =
(1 + 2)  w(1 + 2)
(1  42) and s
F () =
( + 2)  w(1 + 2)
(1  42)
For a positive level of attached service, we assume a condition on w, i.e. w < w0 where
w0 = (+2)
1+2
. The derivative of the utility in relation to x and s gives the energy and
relative service prices:
ux(x(); s(); ) = p
F ()) pF () = w
us(x(); s(); ) = r
F ()) rF () = w
The equilibrium prices in the rst-best situation are equal to marginal cost.
A.2 Increasing costs
Under increasing costs assumption (H5), quantities of the good and the attached service
are given by xF () = 1+
2(1 2)
 and sF () = +
2(1 2)
. Energy and service marginal prices
are given by pF () = xF () and rF () = sF ().
B Nonlinear tari¤ and bundling
With bubdling, the rms objective (EP) can be implemented by an integration by parts:
maxE() =
Z 

[u(x(); s(); )  '()u(x(); s(); )  C(x(); s())] f()d
s.t. ux(x(); s(); ) _x() + us(x(); s(); ) _s()  0
which can allow us to write that _U() = u(x(); s(); ), and at the equilibrium the couple
fx(); s()g satises the system:
ux(x; s; )  '()ux(x; s; ) = c0(x)
us(x; s; )  '()us(x; s; ) = c0(s) (9)
Since '()ux  0 and '()us  0, one can conclude that the quantities are sub-
optimal compared to the complete information situation (given above) for which '()
would equated to zero for all .
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B.1 Constant costs
 The rst and the second order incentive compatibility constraints implemented with
T () = T (x(); s()) are given by:
ux(x; s; ) _x() + us(x; s; ) _s()  _T () = 0
ux(x; s; ) _x() + us(x; s; ) _s()  0
 The variation of xB and sB in relation to  with specied utility function is given
by:
_xB =
1 + 2
(1  42)  0 and _s
B
 =
2 + 
(1  42)  0
B.2 Increasing costs
 The variation of xB and sB in relation to  with the specied utility function is
given by:
_xB =
1 + 
2(1  2)  0 and _s
B
 =
 + 
2(1  2)  0
C Nonlinear tari¤ with the independent pricing strategy
C.1 Supply of good
The shop 1 maximizes its expected prots under the rst and the second order incentive
constraints with t() = t(x()).The expected prots of shop 1 can be rewritten as:
max
U;x;^s
E() =
Z 

h
u(x(); s(^s()); )  c(x())  U()  (^s()))
i
f()d
_U() = u(x(); s(^s()); ) ()
U() = 0
us(x(); s(^s()); ) _s(^s())  _(^s()) = 0 () (IC2)
where f() is the density function of consumers preference. At the equilibrium, we have
^s() = .
From the analysis of Martimort (1992), to solve the program, we write the Hamiltonian
under () and () constraints and :
H(U; x; ^s) = f()[ c(x)  U   (^s) + u(x; s(^s); )]
+()u(x; s(^s); )
+()[us(x; s(^s); ) _s(^s)  (^s)]
The dynamic system of Hamilton-Jacobi (SHJ) in relation to the state variable has a
form:
@H
@U
= _(), _() = f() (1)
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Therefore, according to the edge condition _() = f() and according to the transversal
condition we can restate:
U() = 0 and () = 0 (10)
After have rewritten the edge and transversal conditions we restate the SHJ with respect
to the control variables:
@H
@x
= f()[ c0(x()) + ux(x(); s(^s()); )] + ()
h
ux(x(); s(^s()); )
i
(11)
+()
h
uxs(x(); s(^s()); ) _s(^s())
i
= 0
If we suppose that the principals contracts supply are truthfully ex-post we assume ^s = ,
we can restate:
@H
@^s j^s=
= f()[(  _() + us(x(); s(); ) _s()) (12)
+()(us(x(); s(); ) _s())
+()(uss(x(); s(); )( _s())
2 + us(x(); s(); )s()  ())] = 0
As the principals o¤er truthtelling tari¤ for agents to reveal their true type, the preference
for the service is restated ^s = , the derivative second order condition (IC2) with respect
to  is given by:
s()us(x(); s(); ) + uss(x(); s())( _s())
2   () (13)
+us(x(); s(); ) _s() + uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() _s() = 0
If the solution is separating then _x() 6= 0; _s() 6= 0, the second order incentive compati-
bility conditions are satised and the relation (1) is given by () = F () + k where k is
a constant. As F () = 1; thus:
() = F () + k = 0) k =  1
() = F ()  1 =  (1  F ()) (14)
From the equations (13) and (14) into (12), we can restate the SHJ constraints:
 (1  F ())us(x(); s(); ) _s() + () [ us(x(); s(); ) _s()  uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() _s()] = 0
() =  (1  F ()) us(x(); s(); )
uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() + us(x(); s(); )
(15)
Under the analysis of Martimort (1992), by replacing the equation (15) into the equation
(11), the SHJ can be restated as following:
f()[(ux(x(); s(); )  c0(x())) + ( (1  F ())ux(x(); s(); )) (16)
+( (1  F ()) us(x(); s(); )uxs(x(); s(); ) _s()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() + us(x(); s(); )
)] = 0
It is possible to assume '() = 1 F ()
f()
the equation (16) can be rewritten as: With some
simplications:
 c0(x()) + ux(x(); s(); )  '()ux(x(); s(); )  (17)
 '() us(x(); s(); )uxs(x(); s(); ) _s()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() + us(x(); s(); )
= 0
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with x() = xF ():With the specied utility (H6), the SHJ can be rewritten as -omitting
arguments-:
2      2x+ 2s  (   ) 2 _s
2 _x+ 
= 0 (18)
C.2 Supply of service
The shop 2 maximizes its expected prots with () = (s()). Here, the tari¤ depends
on the quantity of service chosen, thus shop 2 maximizes its expected prots under the
rst and the second order incentive constraints:
max
U;s;^x
E() =
Z 

h
u(x(^x()); s(); )  c(s())  U()  t(^x())
i
f()d
_U() = u(x(^x()); s(); ) ()
U() = 0
ux(x(^x()); s(); ) _x(^x())  _t(^x()) = 0 () (IC2)
where f() is the density function of consumers preferences. At the equilibrium, we have
^x() = . To solve the program, we write the Hamiltonian under () and () constraints
and under the analysis of Martimort (1992):
H(U; s; ^x) = f()[ c(s)  U   t(^x) + u(x(^x); s; )]
+()u(x(^x); s; )
+()[ux(x(^x); s; ) _x(^x)  t(^x)]
Here relations (1), (10) still holds and the optimal path of service is such that:
@H
@s
= f()[ c0(s()) + us(x(^x()); s(); )] + ()
h
us(x(^x()); s(); )
i
(19)
+()
h
uxs(x(^x()); s(); ) _x(^x())
i
= 0
If we suppose that the principals contracts supply are truthfully ex-post we assume
^x = ; we can restate:
@H
@^x j^x=
= f()[(  _t() + ux(x(); s(); ) _x()) (20)
+()(ux(x(); s(); ) _x())
+()(uxx(x(); s(); )( _x())
2 + ux(x(); s(); )x()  t())] = 0
As the principals o¤er truthtelling tari¤ for agents to reveal their true type, the preference
for the service is restated ^x = ; the derivative second order condition (IC2) with respect
to  is given by:
x()ux(x(); s(); ) + uxx(x(); s(); )( _x())
2   t() (21)
+ux(x(); s(); ) _x() + uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() _s() = 0
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If the solution is separating then _s() 6= 0; _x() 6= 0, the second order incentive compat-
ibility conditions are satised and (14) holds again. From equations (14) and (21) into
(20), we can restate the SHJ constraints:
 (1  F ())ux(x(); s(); ) _x() + () [ ux(x(); s(); ) _x()  uxs(x(); s(); ) _x() _s()] = 0
() =  (1  F ()) ux(x(); s(); )
uxs(x(); s(); ) _s() + ux(x(); s(); )
(22)
By replacing equation (22) into (19), the SHJ can be restated as following:
f()[(us(x(); s(); )  c0(s())) + ( (1  F ())us(x(); s(); )) (23)
+( (1  F ()) ux(x(); s(); )(uxs(x(); s(); ) _x()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _s() + ux(x(); s(); )
)] = 0
and equation (23) rewrites:
 c0(s()) + us(x(); s(); )  '()us(x(); s(); )  (24)
 '() ux(x(); s(); )uxs(x(); s(); ) _x()
uxs(x(); s(); ) _s() + ux(x(); s(); ))
= 0
with s() = sF (). Explicitely (24) writes:
(2   )  2s+ 2x  (   ) 2 _x
2 _s+ 1
= 0
C.3 The problem solving system
 We can rewritte the equation (4) as the di¤erential equations system following:8>><
>>:
_x = us(x;s;)
uxs(x;s;)
[us(x; s; )  '()us(x; s; )  c0(s)] [ux(x; s; )  c0(x)]
 (x; s; )
_s = ux(x;s;)
uxs(x;s;)
[ux(x; s; )  '()ux(x; s; )  c0(x)] [us(x; s; )  c0(s)]
 (x; s; )
(25)
where
 (x; s; ) = [us(x; s; )  c0(s)] [ux(x; s; )  c0(x)  '()ux(x; s; )]
  [ux(x; s; )  c0(x)]'()us(x; s; )
with  (xF (); sF (); ) = 0.
We do not attempt to investigate the global analysis of (25), but we rst try to dene
the solution when the service is purely optional that is if (us  0). In this situation, (25)
becomes: 8<
:
 c0(x) + ux(x; s; )  '()ux(x; s; ) = 0
 c0(s) + us(x; s; )  '() ux(x; s; ) uxs(x; s; ) _x
uxs(x; s; ) _s+ ux(x; s; )
22
we see from the rst equation in (4) that x = xB(s) so we know the "reaction" function
xB(s) is increasing33 that is xB0(s) > 0 so (4) writes knows:8<
:
x = xB(s)
 c0(s) + us(x; s; )  '()ux(x; s; ) uxs(x; s; ) x
b0(s) _s
uxs(x; s; ) _s+ ux(x; s; )
= 0
If second order incentive compatibility conditions are satised, such that _x () ; _s () >
0, it must be true that us(x; s; ) = c
0(s) + '()ux(x;s;) uxs(x;s;) x
b0(s) _s
uxs(x;s;) _s+ux(x;s;)
> c0(s) hence34
sIP ()  sB() and xIP () = xb(sIP ())  sB() = xb(sB()) since xb0(s) > 0).
 The quantities of good and service are given by the equation (5) in section 4.3. At
the equilibrium, the couple fx; sg is given by:
x =  

q
1 + 32 2(1 + 4 2) + 42(
p
1 + 32 2 + 7) + 4 (82 + 1)   
1  4 2X (26)
s =  
p
1 + 32 2(1 + 2  ) + 2  (4  + )  1
4
 
1  4 2
where X = 2

3 +
p
1 + 32 2

.
C.4 Increasing costs
 At the equilibrium, the couple fx; sg is given by:
x =  
2(
p
8 2 + 1  1) + (
p
8 2 + 1  7)2 + (1 +
p
8 2 + 1)  43
D
s =  
(
p
8 2 + 1  1)  22 +
p
8 2 + 1 + 1
4
 
1  2 
where D = 2
 
1  2 (3  p8 2 + 1). For the values of parameters, x and s
are negative.
 The comparison between marginal prices with an independent pricing strategy and
in the st-best situation, under a uniform law and with the specic utility funtion,
is given by:
pIP () = pF () +
1
X
(   )
"
 8 4  (10 + 2
p
8 2 + 1)3
 (
p
8 2 + 1  1)32 + 4   (1 
p
8 2 + 1)
#
rIP () = rF () +
1
X
(   )
"
 8 4   (10 + 2
p
8 2 + 1)3
 (
p
8 2 + 1  1)32 + 4  1 +
p
8 2 + 1
#
33Where xb0(s) =   uxs(x;s;) '()uxs(x;s;)
uxx(x;s;) '()uxx(x;s;) c00(x) , indeed x
b() = xb(sB()). Notice that if the service
is purely optional (us = uxs  0) then xb0(s) > 0 since uxx(x; s; ) > 0 and cost are convex.
34We have not prove that this allocation is not unique (as suspected from the analysis of Martimort,
1992) and incentive compatible. However, we admit this is the case.
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D Comparison between IP and bundling strategies
D.1 Constant costs
 The quantities comparison between the situation where the monopoly produces a
bundle and when he/she buys its goods independently is given by:
xIP () = xB() 
   
(1  42)X

( + 2)
q
1 + 32 2   1

+ 162

sIP () = sB() 
   
(1  42)X (1 + 2)
q
1 + 32 2   1

One can directly conclude that xIP () < xB() < xF () and sIP () < sB() <
sF (). With a bundling strategy, optimal quantities of good and service are higher
than with an independent pricing strategy. However, these both quantities are sub-
optimal in relation to the rst-best situation.
D.2 Increasing costs
 When the service is purely optional,  = 0 thus 8 < 1
2
, the marginal price of
good is always smaller in bundle than separatly. With a uniform law on [1; 2] we
can rewrite pIP = pB + 1
D
( 42  
p
1 + 8 2 + 1). The marginal price of service
depends on its optional character in order to satisfy the primary need but also to
the degree of complementarity between the commodity and the contingent service.
However when the service is purely optional, its marginal price is always higher
than under the package form. With a uniform law on [1; 2], we can rewrite as
follows rIP = rB + 1
D
h
 (22   1)(42 +
p
1 + 8 2   1)
i
:
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